Bill C-39 is a large piece of legislation giving the government the authority it believes it needs in order to push forward with a large number of capital infrastructure projects in Canada. In principle, I approve of the motivation. In practice, the implementation is flawed.
Let’s look at how Bill C-39 impacts labour in Canada:
There are several measures designed to facilitate a more productive bargaining process, including: earlier compulsory bargaining for bargaining relationships considered higher-risk, a longer conciliation process, a new “special mediator” stage before some work stoppages, and binding resolution for some first-contract negotiations.
I have no real problem with these, especially is they are adequately funded and resourced. A major problem with a lot of public-sector and infrastructure-related negotiations is that the negotiations don’t actually take place as the employer just sits and waits for the government to eventually intervene.
There are some measures designed to adjust the labour relations map, and specifically, to create broader geographic and multi-employer bargaining units, and to ensure existing collective agreements follow a union when contracts or ownership changes part way through the agreement.
With unions, bigger generally means more powerful, so there’s nothing inherently wrong with broader sectors, though I would say the unions and memberships should definitely have a say in this. People should have the right to choose their own representation, and not have it forced on them.
The most controversial change is a new framework for government intervention in labour disputes. The proposes ‘section 107’ would allow ministers to intervene of the strike or lockout has a “significant impact on the Canadian economy” or if it causes “serious social disruption”. We don’t know what these terms mean; they are not defined in the legislation and, for all practical purposes, could mean anything.
This is a serious issue. Even under the existing labour code, section 87.4, which requires “immediate and serious danger to the safety or health of the public”, ministers felt far too free to issue back-to-work orders against unions. We saw this numerous times under the Trudeau administration and have no reason to believe it wouldn’t continue under a Carney government.
The back-to-work orders wouldn’t matter so much if they were fair-minded. But in every case, forcing the union back to work also means accepting the employer’s bargaining position. It’s not simply back-to-work. It’s back-to-work and cave.
Just once, I would like to see such an order accompanied with a declaration that the employer must accept the union’s proposal. This would have the impact of increasing the risk for employers should they opt to bargain in bad faith and wait for the intervention. No matter how the proposal is implemented, it should not tilt the balance further in favour of the employer.